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In December 2009, the Basel Committee for Bank-
ing Supervision has submitted proposals for a reform
of the regulation of capital requirements for banks in
the wake of the crisis. In its Consultative Document
(Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 2009),
the Basel Committee observes that banks entered
the crisis with too little capital and that the insuffi-
ciency of bank capital played an important role in
the crisis.To improve matters,it proposes an interna-
tional harmonization of the definition of capital and
the introduction of a leverage ratio,as well as tighter
standards for bank liquidity,and various measures to
reduce the procyclical effects of capital regulation.
The Basel Committee does not, however, present
any systematic analysis of why the proposed mea-
sures should have the salutary effects that are
expected of them.
Nor does the Basel Committee present any system-
atic analysis of why the existing system of capital
regulation has failed so miserably in the crisis. Over
the past two decades,this system has been developed
and ever more refined with an enormous investment
of effort and sophistication. Why then could major
banking institutions manage their risks and their
equity in a way that materially contributed to the cri-
sis? Why was bank capital so low that, soon, there
were doubts about solvency and interbank markets
were destroyed by mistrust? What assurance do we
have that individual banks or the overall banking
system would have fared better if the changes that
are now being proposed had already been installed a
decade ago? Is it really enough to tighten a screw
here and put in a new nail there? Or doesn’t the
entire ship of banking regulation need a thorough
overhaul? 
The regulatory community seems unwilling to even
ask such questions. It adheres to a tradition of dis-
cussing the rules of capital regulation among the
bureaucratic cognoscenti, in some interaction with
the industry, without ever providing any theoretical
or empirical analysis of the effects that the measures
under consideration are deemed to have – and with-
out heeding outsiders who demand that such analy-
ses should be just as much a precondition for the
implementation of new regulatory rules as for the
introduction of new pharmaceutical drugs into the
market (Hellwig 1996).
Capital regulation and the financial crisis
It is by now widely recognized that the global finan-
cial crisis of 2007–09 was not just a matter of sub-
prime mortgage securitization in the United States
having gone astray (Hellwig 2009). Serious though it
was,the real estate and mortgage crisis in the United
States was no more substantial than, e.g., the
Japanese banking crisis of the 1990s that did not take
down the global financial system.The real estate and
mortgage crisis in the United States ended up taking
down the global financial system because the institu-
tions that were involved were more fragile and more
interconnected than in previous crises. Moreover,
once the crisis broke into the open, in August 2007,
the system developed an implosive dynamic of its
own, based on the interplay of price decreases in
malfunctioning markets, fair value accounting
requiring immediate writedowns on the affected
assets, an insufficiency of bank capital requiring
deleveraging, thus adding to the downward pressure
on asset prices. The downward spiral that this inter-
play generated didn’t come to a stop until, in
October 2008, the taxpayers of the most important
countries were committed to stepping in.
Fragility was due to excessive indebtedness and to
excessive maturity transformation. In part, these
were due to the development of a shadow banking
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system, institutions outside the domain of banking
regulation that financed themselves by issuing short-
term debt in wholesale markets and invested in trad-
able assets with longer maturities. Thus, conduits 
and structured-investment vehicles (SIVs) provided
banks with a way of investing in asset-backed securi-
ties without putting up the equity that would have
been required if they had held these investments in
their own books.1 The guarantees that the sponsor-
ing banks had provided for these vehicles required
hardly any equity; nor were these guarantees sub-
jected to large-exposure regulation.
In part, excessive indebtedness and maturity trans-
formation were due to the exploitation of the model-
based approach to capital regulation by banks inside
the domain of banking regulation. Many institutions
had equity amounting to 1–3 percent of their balance
sheets even as they were vaunting themselves as hav-
ing 10 percent “core capital”. The latter quantity,
which relates equity to risk-weighted assets, is of
course useless if the risk weights have not been cho-
sen appropriately. An example is provided by UBS
Investment Bank (UBS 2008), which retained the
super-senior tranches of MBS CDOs of their own
creation in their own portfolio, avoiding capital
charges against the credit risks of these securities
through credit default swaps.2 The correlation of the
counterparty risks of these credit default swaps with
the underlying credit risks of the MBS CDOs them-
selves went unnoticed.3
When the crisis broke into the open in August 2007,
much of the shadow banking system fell apart. Be-
cause rating downgrades induced significant capital
losses on assets held by conduits and SIVs, refinanc-
ing of these vehicles through the market was no
longer forthcoming. In line with the guarantees they
had given, the sponsoring banks had to step in. As
they did so,they had to take these vehicles into their
own books. As a result, they were short of equity;
some of them were even insolvent because the vehi-
cles that they had guaranteed had incurred losses
that exceeded their own previous equity. For those
that were not insolvent, the capital charges against
the assets newly taken into their own books created
a need to raise additional capital or to deleverage by
selling assets.
A need to raise additional capital or to deleverage by
selling assets also arose for institutions that had to take
writedowns on asset values in their books and that
failed to have “free capital”, i.e., capital in excess of
regulatory requirements. In the crisis, however, there
was only limited scope for raising new capital. There-
fore, a lot of deleveraging had to take place. Such de-
leveraging is unproblematic if it involves a single bank
trying to improve the structure of its balance sheet.It is
a source of systemic risk, however, if there are many
banks trying to improve the structures of their balance
sheets by selling assets and reducing their debts. Such
simultaneous deleveraging will mainly serve to lower
asset prices.The asset price decreases feed back into a
need for further writedowns, again cutting into bank
equity and creating a need for further deleveraging.
The systemic problem is enhanced by maturity trans-
formation. If economic lifetimes of assets are short,
some deleveraging can be engineered, even at the
level of the overall system, by not reinvesting when
the assets’ lifetimes come to an end.If economic life-
times of assets are long,however,such disinvestment
by the overall system is not possible. Houses and
long-term mortgages are there and have to be held
by someone. Individuals can disinvest by selling
them, but the system as a whole cannot do so.4 Thus,
the various conduits,SIVs and investment banks that
held asset-backed securities with medium to long-
term maturities and that refinanced themselves by
issuing debt of very short maturities contributed to
systemic risk not only because they were overindebt-
ed but also because their balance sheets contained
the seeds of a tremendous deleveraging spiral.
The deleveraging spiral was particularly pronounced
because the multipliers for deleveraging were enor-
mous.If equity amounts to 2.5 percent of the balance
sheet, one dollar’s worth of losses creates a need to
sell forty dollars’ worth of assets on average in order
to bring the capital ratio back into line.
If equity amounts to 2.5 percent of the balance sheet,
it also doesn’t take long for concerns about solvency
to arise.5 Such concerns cause frictions for refinanc-
1 According to Acharya, Schnabl and Suarez (2009), this is the only
reason why these investments seemed worthwhile.
2 Thus, in its Annual Report (2007, 87), AIG writes that “approxi-
mately $ 379 billion … of the $ 527 billion in notional exposure of
AIGFP’s super senior credit default swap portfolio as of December
31, 2007 represents derivatives written, for financial institutions,
principally in Europe, for the purpose of providing them with reg-
ulatory capital relief rather than risk mitigation.”
3 On the role of such correlations of counterparty risks and under-
lying risks in derivatives hiding systemic risk, see Hellwig (1995).
4 For a warning about this, see Blum and Hellwig (1996).
5 Prior to the crisis,UBS had equity capital equal to CHF 40 billion,
with an overall balance sheet of CHF 1,600 billion. Losses on sub-
prime-mortgage backed securities and derivatives amounted to
well over CHF 40 billion. If it hadn’t been for recapitalization by
the government of Singapore and by the Swiss Confederacy, …ing, in particular, in the wholesale markets that pro-
vided the major source of short-term funding for
many institutions. Fears for one’s own refinancing
prevent institutions from acting as buyers of securi-
ties even if prices are deemed to be “too low”. Such
fears may also create incentives for deleveraging in
excess of regulatory requirements,thereby adding to
the spiral. From August 2007 until October 2008,
there were several episodes where interbank mar-
kets broke down and central banks had to step in to
replace them. In the end, in the wake of the Lehman
insolvency, these markets broke down completely,
and the turmoil in the global financial system
induced governments to step in and provide whole-
sale guarantees for financial institutions.
Regulatory capture by sophistication: a brief history
of capital regulation
The focus of banking regulation on bank capital is a
recent phenomenon. From the 1930s to the 1970s,
banking regulation and supervision focused on mar-
ket structure,asset allocation rules and interest rates.
Between the mid-1970s and the late 1980s, however,
these modes of regulation were largely dismantled.
They had become dysfunctional because financial
innovations, the liberalization of international capi-
tal flows,and the revolution in information and com-
munication technologies had intensified competition
in financial sectors all over the world.
The Basel Accord of 1988 tried to stop this trend
towards deregulation. Under the guise of interna-
tional harmonization of banking regulation, the Ac-
cord stipulated minimum capital requirements for
banks. For ordinary credit risks the capital charge
amounted to 8 percent of the loan.6 Banks were
required to have equity capital exceeding the sum of
capital charges.
In 1993, the Basel Committee presented a proposal
for extending capital regulation to market risks, i.e.,
the risks from changes in market prices of assets held
in the trading books of banks. This proposal, which
corresponds roughly to what is now called the “stan-
dard approach”,was greeted with scorn by the indus-
try.The rigid capital ratios that it stipulated were said
to mark a step back from the quality of risk manage-
ment which sophisticated banking institutions had
already achieved through the development of quan-
titative models with a firm conceptual and empirical
foundation. Risk management on the basis of these
models was said to be much more precisely attuned
to the actual risks that different assets posed for the
banks.Following this lobbying,the 1996 Amendment
to the Capital Accord to Incorporate Market Risks
gave banks the option to determine regulatory capi-
tal on the basis of their own risk models rather than
the standard approach. “Basel II”, the second Basel
Accord, which was concluded after long delibera-
tions in the mid-2000’s, provides a similar option for
credit risks as well as market risks (Basel Committee
on Banking Supervision 2004).
The various modifications of “Basel” since the mid-
1990s have all been designed so improve the risk cal-
ibration of capital requirements. The idea was, in
principle, that average capital requirements should
be unchanged, but regulatory capital should be ever
more closely attuned to actual risks in banking. In
fact, these modifications have enabled the large, in-
ternationally active banking institutions to reduce
regulatory capital,more precisely,to use their capital
for ever more levered activities.7 This development
underlies the Basel Committee’s finding that,as they
went into the crisis, large banks had equity amount-
ing to only 2 percent of their balance sheets (Basel
Committee on Banking Supervision 2009, # 7). The
Basel Committee ascribes this finding to various
deficiencies of risk models and risk management. It
fails to consider the possibility that the very attempt
to calibrate regulatory capital towards measured risks
might be responsible for the insufficiency of bank
equity capital.
The fact that the equity of many banks is much lower
than it was before the mid-1990s is not so much due
to deficiencies in risk modeling as to the incentives
that bank managers have to expand the business of
their banks as much as they can get away with.
“Economizing on equity”, the catch phrase of the
industry, is really a euphemism for a strategy that
tries to capture the excess returns to equity that are
associated with high leverage. If the balance sheet is
forty or fifty times equity, even small margins
between asset returns and refinancing costs can be
turned into substantial returns on equity. In a world
of “shareholder value” and “market discipline”, in a
discourse with analysts, investors and the media that
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is focused on returns as opposed to risks, bank man-
agers have strong incentives to go after these returns,
neglecting the induced risks for creditors, the finan-
cial system and last but not least the taxpayer. The
deficiencies of risk modeling and risk management
that we have seen should at least partly be ascribed
to these incentives. Eliminating these deficiencies
without addressing the underlying incentives will
merely shift the problem elsewhere.
The real problem is one of governance. The Basel
process has focused so much on risk calibration that
the problem of governance has been neglected. The
problem of governance arises because a financial
institution’s activities can induce substantial risks for
the financial system and for the taxpayer. In the
absence of regulation, there is no reason why these
external effects should be taken into account by
bank managers. Regulation and supervision are
there to reduce this governance problem. When the
model-based approach to capital regulation was
introduced, however, the regulatory community was
so impressed with the sophistication of recently
developed techniques of risk assessment and risk
management of banks that they lost sight of the fact
that the sophistication of risk modeling does not
eliminate the governance problem which results
from the discrepancy between the private interests
of the bank’s managers and the public interest in
financial stability.8
The illusion of measurability of risks
The Basel Committee is certainly right in finding
that many of the risks that were realized in the crisis
had not been properly accounted for in the various
risk models that were used to determine regulatory
capital under the model-based approach:
• Insufficient account was taken of risks arising
from correlations of credit risks in mortgages or
mortgage-backed securities and other derivatives.
Such correlations arise naturally from a common
dependence on underlying factors of macroeco-
nomic significance such as market rates of inter-
est, real-estate prices, or the business cycle.
Earlier instances of the problem, which should
have served as warnings, occurred in the various
real-estate and banking crises of the late 1980s
and early 1990s in the United Kingdom, the
Scandinavian countries, Japan, Switzerland and
others.
• Insufficient account was taken of risks arising
from correlations between counterparty credit
risks and underlying risks in derivatives and other
hedge contracts. Such correlations arise naturally
when the counterparty is concluding many similar
contracts at the same time. Earlier instances of
the problem, which should have served as warn-
ings, concerned variable-rate mortgages in the
1980s and dollar-denominated loans from inter-
national banks to Thai banks and from Thai banks
to Thai firms in the mid-1990s. Default rates on
the former shot up, e.g., in the United Kingdom,
when, in the late 1980s, market rates were very
high; default rates on the latter shot up when, fol-
lowing the devaluation of the Baht in 1997, Thai
firms, which were doing business in domestic cur-
rency, were unable to fulfill their dollar-denomi-
nated obligations (see also Hellwig 1995).
• Insufficient account was taken of the possibility
that asset prices might tumble because important
institutions holding these assets were unsoundly
financed and might have to sell.This risk has not
recently been observed, but it figured prominent-
ly among the reasons why, in 1998, Long Term
Capital Management was rescued from immedi-
ate insolvency.
The Basel Committee is wrong, however, in looking
at these deficiencies as technical flaws that can be
corrected by improvements in rules and procedures.
These deficiencies should instead be seen as symp-
toms of more fundamental problems which raise
doubts about the model-based approach to capital
regulation altogether.
In the first place, the empirical basis for risk model-
ing is often insufficient. Many of the time series that
are being used are very short.Moreover,they tend to
exhibit substantial non-stationarities which preclude
reliable estimates of the underlying structures.9 These
problems are particularly serious when it comes to
estimating correlations.10 For credit risks, there is the
added complication that defaults are relatively rare
events – unlike changes in asset prices.
8 Hellwig and Staub (1996) document a panel discussion held at the
time.The governance problem, which was raised in my own contri-
bution, was either overlooked or disregarded by the representa-
tives of the Basel process, the regulatory community as well as the
industry.
9 I raised these issues in my contribution to Hellwig and Staub
(1996).Their relevance in the context of the crisis is documented in
UBS’s Shareholder Report on UBS’s Writedowns (UBS 2008).
10 For a warning about this prior to the crisis, see Duffie (2007).More importantly, many of the risks involved are
not exogenously given, but must be seen as en-
dogenous.They depend on the behavior of the par-
ties in question and on the development of the
markets in which these parties operate. They
change over time,and these changes are hardly ob-
servable from the outside.Thus, counterparty cred-
it risks in derivatives and other hedge contracts –
and the correlations of these counterparty risks
with the underlying risks – depend on total expo-
sures of the counterparties from such contracts.
These exposures depend on the counterparties’
contracts with third parties; if the counterparties
are active on both sides of the market, transferring
the risks yet to other participants, the exposure also
depends on the counterparty credit risks of these
further contracts. The notion that these risks are
objectively given and can be reliably measured is
no more than an illusion.11
Some of the endogeneity involves the system as a
whole.As I explained in Section 2 above, the down-
ward spiral of the financial system from August 2007
to October 2008 can be understood as a systemic
response to a collective deleveraging attempt. Some
of the correlations that have been observed arise
from the co-dependence of different markets on the
factors that drive the overall system. The correla-
tions and non-stationarities that these systemic fac-
tors induce are hardly amenable to measurement,let
alone reliable measurement.
Conceptual deficits of capital regulation
In discussions with industry representatives or mem-
bers of the regulatory community, I am often asked
the rhetorical question “Don’t you agree that a sys-
tem of regulation that calibrates capital require-
ments to risks is better than a system of regulation
that fails to do so.” The presumptions behind this
question have dominated the discourse about capital
regulation since the early 1990s. However, as long as
the context is not clear, as long as the objectives and
the presumed functioning of capital regulation have
not been specified, the question is ill-posed. I might
as well answer that the Soviet Union’s five-year
plans under Breshnev were better than those under
Stalin, before the computer age.12
The regulatory community as well as industry must
take the blame for never having specified the objec-
tives and the presumed functioning of capital regula-
tion. Ever since it started, with the deliberations
about Basel I,discussion about the development and
refinement of capital regulation has suffered from
the following deficits:
• The precise objective of the regulation is unclear.
• The dynamics of implementation over time have
not been given sufficient attention.
• Systemic concerns have been neglected.
These deficits are one reason why, even if they knew
that risk calibration was mainly a tool to reduce cap-
ital requirements, the regulatory community has
been unable to put up stronger resistance against the
industry’s claims that capital regulation must be fine-
ly attuned to the actual risks that banks are taking.
They are also a reason why dysfunctional effects of
the regulation have by and large been overlooked.
Objectives: In principle, capital regulation should
contribute to maintaining the safety and soundness
of banks. How it serves this purpose is usually not
explained, at least not beyond the truism that insol-
vency corresponds to a situation where equity is neg-
ative.There seem to be three possibilities:
• Capital serves as a buffer against unexpected losses.
• Capital reduces incentives for incurring risks that
might end up burdening creditors or the taxpayer.
• A capital requirement provides the supervisor
with room for intervention before the bank
becomes insolvent.
In the various documents on banking regulation, all
three purposes of capital requirements are named.No
account is given, however, of the differences between
them, and, in particular, of possible conflicts and
trade-offs concerning appropriate standards for
determining regulatory capital. Whereas the role of
capital as a buffer against losses might call for a cali-
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112 ff.) only calls for a consideration of counterparty risks in hedge
contracts without explaining how this is to be done.The role of cor-
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12 The latest example in this discussion is provided by Frenkel and
Rudolf (2010), an expertise on behalf of the Bundesverband
deutscher Banken, the association of private banks in Germany.
The authors acknowledge that the lack of bank equity has played a
role in the crisis, but oppose the introduction of a leverage ratio
approach without risk calibration on the grounds that (i) such a
regulation would induce a credit crunch and (ii) deficits in risk-cal-
ibrated capital regulation should be eliminated by improving that
regulation rather than introducing a bound on leverage ratios.They
do not discuss why capital was as low as it was.Nor do they observe
that the credit crunch argument against a leverage ratio would
apply just as much to an attempt to raise bank equity by improved
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bration with respect to total risk,the role of capital as
an incentive device would call for calibration with
respect to incremental risks, and, finally, the role of
capital regulation as a basis for intervention prior to
insolvency would call for a calibration with respect to
the ease with which assets can be disposed of during
this intervention. The three modes of calibration dif-
fer; the differences have so far not been considered.
Dynamics of Implementation over Time: Prior to the
crisis,there was no consideration of the paradox that
the buffer function of regulatory capital is limited
because this capital is needed to satisfy the regulator.
The dynamics of implementation over time had not
received much attention. Conceptually, the discus-
sion had hardly moved beyond a two-period model
where financing and investment decisions are taken
in period one, returns are realized and paid out in
period two,and then the world ends.In a two-period
world, of course, the buffer function of capital and
the effects of capital on incentives for risk taking are
easily understood.
If one moves from a two-period model to a real
world where financing, investment and payout deci-
sions are taken on an ongoing basis, neither the buf-
fer argument nor the incentive argument can be
taken for granted. The incentive argument breaks
down because today’s anticipation of tomorrow’s
capital requirements can induce additional risk tak-
ing today; the reason is that, if the additional dollar
of earnings on today’s investment can be reinvested
tomorrow with a multiplier of fifty, this multiplier
enhances the attraction today of gambles that offer
large prizes if they succeed (Blum 1999).The buffer
argument breaks down when the interplay of price
declines,fair-value accounting and capital regulation
forces the bank to deleverage by selling assets; such
deleveraging may even endanger long-run solvency
because, in malfunctioning markets of the sort that
we have seen in the crisis, market prices of assets
may well be below discounted present values of
returns.13
In a world with on-going financing and investment
decisions of banks, a key question must be how cap-
ital regulation ought to be implemented over time,in
particular, how the bank’s assets and liabilities
should be adjusted over time when unexpected loss-
es have caused equity capital to drop. Schemes for
dynamic provisioning and de-provisioning that are
currently under discussion represent a step in this
direction. However, I suspect that current plans in-
volve too many illusions about the scope for attuning
such dynamics to macro-developments, measure-
ments of cyclicality and the like.
Neglect of Systemic Concerns: Three aspects merit
particular mention. First, in the context of risk cali-
bration of regulatory capital, too little attention is
paid to the dependence of counterparty credit risk
and of market risks on systemic developments. The
various correlations that I have mentioned above
provide relevant examples. Second, in the context of
implementation dynamics, too little attention is paid
to the systemic impact of regulation-induced de-
leveraging. Forcing Bank A to deleverage when it
has experienced losses will harm Bank B if Bank A’s
asset sales depress the prices of securities held by
Bank B.If Bank B in turn is induced to sell assets,the
backlash may end up hurting Bank A itself.Contrary
to the ideology of capital regulation,such deleverag-
ing can hurt the safety and soundness of the institu-
tions that are forced into it.
Third, the model-based approach to determining cap-
ital regulation has increased the susceptibility of
financial institutions to systemic developments. Two
mechanisms seem particularly important. First, by
encouraging banks to engage in derivative transac-
tions as a way of removing risks, if not out of their
books, at least out of their models, the model-based
approach has contributed to enhancing the intercon-
nectivity of the system. There is thus more room for
domino effects than there used to be.The fate of AIG
is a case in point. Second, because, under the model-
based approach,capital requirements for market risks
tend to be lower than capital requirements for credit
risks, this approach has encouraged banks to put as
many assets as possible into their trading books
rather than their credit books. They were thus more
vulnerable to book losses arising from changes in
asset prices arising from market malfunctioning and/
or other institutions’ deleveraging.
Conclusion
The preceding analysis shows that it is not enough to
tighten a screw here and put in a new nails there.The
system of banking regulation as a whole needs a
thorough overhaul. Such an overhaul should pursue
two major objectives:
13 For an assessment of market prices versus discounted present
values of returns in the crisis, see International Monetary Fund
(2008)• We should get away from the illusion that regula-
tion should be finely attuned to the risks that
banks are taking.The attempt to do so has been a
major factor in the decline in the banks’ equity
relative to the volume of their activities.
• We should aim for substantially higher regulatory
capital, well above ten percent and perhaps even
closer to the twenty or thirty percent that was
common before banks became used to the idea
that the taxpayer couldn’t afford to let them fail.
Such high capital requirements would still be pro-
cyclical.However,deleveraging multipliers between
3 and 4 are much to be preferable to deleveraging
multipliers of 40 or 50. Moreover, interbank mar-
kets would be much less likely to be perturbed by
worries about solvency.
At this point, the banking community will object,
saying that equity capital is scarce and expensive.
However, I have never yet seen an argument as to
why the social cost of bank equity should be high.
There may be a high private cost, though even that
may be questioned. In any case, the 25 percent or so
required rate of return on equity that some bank
managers claim is the market’s benchmark for banks
is not an appropriate measure of either private or
social costs of bank equity.This benchmark itself is a
result of the industry’s being undercapitalized; it re-
flects the risks induced by this undercapitalization.
The fact that risks are reduced if the bank has more
equity capital is neglected if the benchmark is taken
as given. Some of this risk reduction will provide a
private benefit to the bank itself, involving better
conditions on newly issued dept – and even a lower-
ing of the marginal cost of equity capital itself.14
Some of the risk reduction will provide benefits to
existing creditors, to the rest of the financial system
and to taxpayers.While these benefits may not figure
in the bank’s own calculations, they ought to be part
of any evaluation of the social costs and social bene-
fits of having high and nonmanipulable equity
requirements.
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